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Abstract This paper presents a first empirical assessment of carnivore conservation under
a performance payment scheme. In Sweden, reindeer herder villages are paid based on the
number of lynx (lynx lynx) and wolverine (gulo gulo) offspring certified on their pastures.
The villages decide on the internal payment distribution. It is generally assumed that benefit
distribution rules are exogenous. We investigate them as an endogenous decision. The data
reveals that villages’ group size has a direct negative effect on conservation outcomes and
an indirect positive effect which impacts conservation outcomes through the benefit distrib-
ution rule. This result revises the collective action hypothesis on purely negative effects of
group size.
Keywords Performance payments · Group payments · Wildlife conservation ·
Empirical policy assessment · Sweden · Lynx · Wolverine
1 Introduction
Conservation performance payments constitute a fairly new approach within environmen-
tal policy design. This paper investigates the determinants of variation in outcomes of such
an approach for carnivore conservation across Sami villages in Sweden. Performance pay-
ments can be placed within the larger group of payments for environmental services (PES).
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Their distinguishing characteristic is that incentives are tied to indicators of environmental
outcomes. Other more conventional PES schemes, by contrast, often tie payments to the
provision of inputs into the production process of an environmental good (Engel et al. 2008),
which may cause distortion.
The most prominent advantage of the performance payment approach is that the condi-
tionality on the provision of environmental outcomes provides very direct incentives, leav-
ing maximum flexibility and room for innovations in the production process of the good
(Musters et al. 2001; Gorddard et al. 2008). Furthermore, direct performance payments are,
under plausible conditions, found to be more cost-effective than other less direct conventional
approaches (Ferraro and Simpson 2002; Wätzold and Drechsler 2005).
Challenges in scheme design arise when the identification of undistorted performance
indicators is intricate, or secondary goals such as targeting payments to the poor need to be
met. Additionally, allocating payments for mobile environmental goods such as wildlife or
water to individuals may prove difficult (Haaren and Bathke 2008). When the performance
indicator is only observable at the group level, it may be easier instead to allocate payments to
the corresponding group, such as a village. The responsibility for finding a suitable internal
payment distribution mechanism devolves to the group, thus creating a collective action
problem.
Previous work on performance payment schemes for wildlife conservation has mainly
been descriptive (e.g. Nelson 2009; see Dickman et al. 2011 for a review on literature cover-
ing financial incentives for predator conservation). Zabel and Holm-Müller (2008) present an
overview of the Swedish performance payment scheme for carnivore conservation. Several
further studies suggest testing the performance payment approach as a new strategy to mitigate
carnivore-livestock conflicts (Muhly and Musiani 2009; Nyhus et al. 2005). To our knowl-
edge, the only theoretical investigation compares the incentives generated in a conservation
performance payment scheme to those of a simple livestock compensation scheme (Zabel
et al. 2011). They find that both approaches can theoretically provide sufficient incentives
for a livestock herder to let a carnivore population increase to the social planner’s optimum.
In addition to theoretical investigations, empirical evaluations of conservation policies are
important to facilitate learning from existing schemes and to improve the development of new
schemes. However, quantitative evaluation studies for conservation policies are fairly rare
(Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006; Ferraro and Gjertsen 2009). Pattanayak et al. (2010) review
impact evaluations of PES programs but an empirical assessment of a larger conservation
performance payment scheme is still lacking (Abensperg-Traun 2009; Milne and Niesten
2009).
The Swedish policy investigated in this paper collectively rewards Sami villages, i.e.
groups of reindeer herders, for increases in the carnivore population on the village’s territory.
We hypothesize that the variation in conservation outcomes across villages can be determined
by (1) each village’s ability to engage in collective action to solve the common pool resource
dilemma, (2) the modalities of distributing the performance payment within the village, and
(3) the natural environment.
Since the Swedish policy issues rewards for carnivore conservation to villages, the vil-
lages’ residents are required to manage the use or distribution of the money. The previous
literature on common pool natural resource management (CPNRM) problems has generally
assumed that benefit distribution rules are exogenously given (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Agrawal
2001). This paper adds to the theoretical concepts of CPNRM regimes by revisiting this
assumption. A model to explore how a group decides internally on the allocation of resource
benefits is developed. The hypotheses developed are tested with village and household-level
data collected in Sweden from participants in the first large-scale performance payment
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scheme for carnivore conservation. The contribution of this paper is twofold: it adds to the
theoretical conceptions of common pool resource management problems and has particular
policy relevance because it is an empirical assessment of a rare example of a performance
payment scheme targeting biodiversity conservation. Understanding the factors driving the
success or failure of this type of scheme is crucial for designing similar policies elsewhere.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the Swedish per-
formance payment scheme. Section 3 discusses the theoretical concepts according to which
variation in conservation outcomes across villages are assessed. The empirical investigation
conducted in Sweden during 2008 and 2009 is presented and discussed in Section 4. The last
section concludes the paper.
2 The Swedish Performance Payment Scheme for Carnivore Conservation
Many large mammals, including carnivores, are globally endangered (Hilton-Taylor et al.
2009). On the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened
Species, wolverines (gulo gulo) are categorized as near threatened and lynx (lynx lynx) are
listed in the category ‘least concern’. Lynx are also listed as a protected fauna species in
Annex III of the Bern Convention.
The Swedish government has set explicit population numbers as benchmark goals for its
lynx and wolverine conservation policy. The goal for the reindeer herding area in northern
Sweden, which covers approximately two-thirds of the country, is to have 90 wolverine
offspring and 80 lynx offspring annually. These offspring numbers correspond to a total
population of approximately 400 wolverines and 400 lynx. On a national level, i.e. including
regions beyond the reindeer herding area, the goal is to have 300 lynx offspring, corresponding
to a total population of 1,500 lynx (Swedish Government Bill 2000).
Participants in the performance payment scheme are indigenous Swedish Sami reindeer
herders. The carnivores’ habitat overlaps with the grazing grounds of their semi-domesticated
reindeer. During winter, the diet of wolverines and lynx consists to a large extent of reindeer
(Pedersen et al. 1999). On average, each lynx and wolverine is estimated to annually prey
on 40 reindeer (Swenson and Andrén 2005), causing major economic losses to the reindeer
herders (Persson 2005; Swenson and Andrén 2005; Danell et al. 2006). Reindeer herding is
of central importance to the Sami people and has for centuries been deeply rooted in their
culture. The herders are organized into 51 Sami villages1, which are located from north of
the Arctic Circle to the more southern county of Dalarna. The reindeer are husbanded in
a nomadic herding system; they move from the coastal areas in winter to the mountainous
regions closer to the Norwegian border in summer. The reindeer herders have grazing rights to
private lands and forests. In this herding system, reindeer are rarely kept in protected corrals,
rendering them fairly easy prey for carnivores. Other non-Sami people also live in the regions
covered by the Sami villages. Until 1996, a conventional compensation policy was in place.
To claim compensation, the herders were required to find the carcass of a reindeer killed
by a carnivore. Because searching for dead reindeer was cumbersome and this approach did
not provide direct incentives for carnivore conservation, it was replaced by a performance
payment scheme. Under this plan, searching for reindeer carcasses is unnecessary; instead,
the carnivores have to be inventoried each winter. This is done in cooperation between herders
and rangers and carried out according to very detailed regulations.
1 The term ‘Sami village’ refers to a community of reindeer herders, but also to the geographical area where a
community has grazing rights, but not property rights. In the following, the term will refer to the community.
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Fig. 1 Development of lynx and wolverine offspring in Swedish Sami villages Data sources: (Viltskadecenter
2009a, b, 2010, 2011, 2012a, b; Andrén and Liberg 2008)
The amount of the performance payment (SEK 200,000 per offspring, SEK 1≈ USD
0.15) is computed to, on average, compensate slightly more than the damage a carnivore is
expected to cause during its lifetime. Apart from simply compensating damage, tying the
payment to the number of offspring is intended to provide pro-conservation incentives, i.e.
incentives not to hunt. Long-term studies with radio-collared animals which started prior to
the policy change found that illegal poaching was a serious issue that impacted wolverine
and lynx conservation (Persson 2007; Andrén et al. 2006).
To acknowledge the hardship that carnivore attacks can impose on the reindeer herding
business, the current policy allows for limited ‘protective hunting’. The Sami villages can
apply for permission to hunt certain individual animals that cause excessive damage. Given
the different conservation status of wolverines and lynx, protective hunting permissions are
granted more restrictively for wolverines than for lynx. The government decreed that lynx
should continue living in the reindeer herding area, but that only 80 of the national goal of
300 offspring need be in this area, while the larger part of the population should be spread
across southern Sweden (Swedish Government Bill 2000). Wolverines thrive in undisturbed
mountain terrain, which implies that the core population will inevitably be in the reindeer
herding area. Figure 1 depicts the development of lynx and wolverine offspring, aggregated
for all Sami villages, since the start of the performance payment scheme. The number of
certified lynx offspring has been above the policy’s benchmark for more than a decade.
The number of wolverine offspring passed the conservation goal for the first time in 2008.
However, there is substantial variation in the number of lynx and wolverine offspring between
villages.
3 Theoretical Concepts
Two major issues are assessed in this paper: (1) whether conservation outcomes at the village
level are a function of collective action and (2) what determines villages’ internal bene-
fit distribution rules, which themselves are hypothesized to aid in explaining conservation
outcomes. Collective action is defined as an “action taken by a group (either directly or
on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interests”
(Marshall 1996, p. 64). In the Swedish context, the reindeer herders need to engage in collec-
tive action to refrain jointly from poaching carnivores and to solve the common pool resource
problem which arises when the state issues performance payments to the various villages
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and devolves decisions about further use and distribution of that money to village members.
A village will try to optimize its collective net benefit of performance payments subtractive
of the cost of reindeer losses. For a rational homo oeconomicus-type herder, the decisive
question will be whether his personal cost-benefit ratio is better with or without a marginal
carnivore. The herder can then choose to work cooperatively with the other members of the
village or diverge from the collective decision. We test the hypothesis that the conservation
outcome at the village level, measured in numbers of carnivore offspring, is determined by
natural geographical factors and the villages’ potential to solve the common pool resource
problem.
Concerning the second issue, in the literature, benefit distribution rules have generally
been assumed to be exogenously given2 (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001). The conceptual
contribution of this paper, presented in Sect. 3.2, is to explain the allocation rule as a variable
endogenously determined by the reindeer herders in each village.
3.1 Determinants of Collection Action for Conservation Success
Collective action theory compiles factors that are hypothesized to impact the outcomes of
CPNRM problems (see Agrawal 2001 for a summary of this literature). To analyze the
Swedish scheme, the following factors are of particular importance: (1) group size; (2) het-
erogeneity; (3) exit options; (4)social capital; (5) resource system characteristics; and (6)
institutional arrangements.
3.1.1 Group Size
Members of smaller groups or communities often have multiple interrelationships and repeat-
edly interact with each other. Individuals’ actions are more observable in small, close-knit
societies than in larger, more anonymous communities (Baland and Platteau 1996). These
features are hypothesized to reduce incentives to defect from contributing to collective action
because members of small groups are more likely to reflect on the long-term aftermath and
reputation effects of their actions than merely the short-term gains (Baland and Platteau
1996). Agreements may also be easier and less costly to reach in small groups since the
costs of communicating and bargaining are lower (Olson 1965). These considerations sup-
port the hypothesis that small group size is beneficial for collective action. On the other hand,
extremely small groups are hypothesized to exhibit low levels of collective action due to
prohibitively high fixed costs of organizing collective effort (Gebremedhin et al. 2004).
In the Swedish Sami villages, the number of reindeer enterprises within each village can
be used as a proxy for group size. Since organizational structures already exist in all villages,
costs to initiate collective action are unlikely to be prohibitively large, even in very small
villages. We expect instead the effects of personal interrelationships to dominate, so that
conservation success is negatively impacted by group size.
3.1.2 Heterogeneity
With respect to the provision of public goods, Olson (1965) suggests that some degree of
heterogeneity is beneficial because otherwise no one would take a lead in managing the
2 A step towards endogenizing benefit contribution within local communities is made in the Engel (2005)
game-theoretic model of community-based irrigation management in Ghana. Payoffs in her model depend
on land distribution and the distributional rule for maintenance costs. Land distribution is modelled as an
endogenous outcome based on consensus and are shown to depend on the (exogenous) cost distribution rule.
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resource in question. By contrast, Baland and Platteau (1999) suggest that while agents with
greater endowments and a larger stake in the conservation of a resource may be incentivized
to conserve a common property resource, agents with smaller endowments and a lesser stake
in the resource may have fewer incentives to do so. As inequality in endowment increases,
establishing and adhering to rules for collective action of common property management
becomes more difficult. Likewise, differences in asset ownership or wealth can give rise to
feelings of envy or rivalry, which may negatively affect collective action. Such effects can
be especially disruptive in small groups (Baland and Platteau 1996).
In the Swedish case, an individual’s endowment is linked to the size of his reindeer herd.
Differences in management interests can arise with heterogeneity in reindeer ownership.
According to Baland and Platteau’s theory, this heterogeneity may also be an indicator for
problems of envy and rivalry, which could hamper finding solutions for the management
of the performance payments. If such intra-community problems are severe, applying for
protective hunting may be a less onerous solution than conserving many carnivores on the
village’s territory. A negative relationship between heterogeneity and conservation success is
thus likely. The empirical analysis will show whether the data support Baland and Platteau’s or
Olson’s theory. At the village level, heterogeneity of reindeer ownership can be measured by a
Gini index. An index value of zero indicates that all reindeer enterprises have an equal number
of reindeer; the more unequal the number, i.e. the more concentrated reindeer ownership is,
the closer the index value moves to one.
3.1.3 Exit Options
Exit options refer to possibilities of deriving income or the means of living from sources
beyond the resource at question. The classical hypothesis is that group members who do not
or cannot make use of exit options have strong incentives to work towards a sustainable use
of the resource (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001). Members whose livelihoods are not bound to
the local resource may have less interest in its long-term use (Baland and Platteau 1996).
In Sweden, exit options can be measured as the percentage of working time that reindeer
owners spend outside the reindeer business. An average of this percentage can be used to
obtain a village-level variable. Part-time reindeer herders naturally have less time to protect
their reindeer from carnivore attacks and as a consequence are likely to incur higher losses.
Thus, villages in which on average herders are heavily engaged in outside jobs may be
more likely to apply for protective hunting, which reduces conservation success. By contrast,
villages with many full-time herders are likely to incur fewer reindeer losses per carnivore and
so may be willing to host more of them. Villages can apply for protective hunting permission
at the nature conservation agency. The agency evaluates the applications on a case-by-case
basis. Generally, permissions have been granted quite generously for lynx but very cautiously
for wolverines because of the differences in their conservation status.
3.1.4 Social Capital
In recent years, the interest in social capital as a factor enhancing collective action has greatly
increased. Putnam (1995) defines social capital as features of social organization which
can help to advance cooperation for mutual benefit and help resolve problems of collective
action. Examples for such facilitating features are networks, norms, and social trust, which
can simplify coordination and amplify reputations (Putnam 1995). Field (2003) states that in
Putnam’s view social capital contributes to collective action by raising the costs of defection,
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strengthening reciprocity, enhancing exchange of information on people’s reputation, and
providing a pattern for future cooperation.
With respect to the Swedish context, Putnam’s proposition supports the hypothesis that
social capital in a reindeer herder village may have a positive impact on conservation success
as an outcome of collective action. Social cohesion can function as a proxy for social capital.
Social cohesion can be measured by asking for opinions on statements such as whether ‘most
members of a village are interested in the villagers’ common welfare and only a few are
interested solely in their private welfare’. Scores can be attributed to given answer categories
to indicate a range from low to high perceived social cohesion (Krishna 2004). Scores can
be averaged over villages to obtain village-level variables.
3.1.5 Resource System Characteristics
The largest variation in resource system characteristics in the Sami villages is their topogra-
phy. The villages in the north and west have predominantly mountainous terrain with no tree
cover at high altitudes, whereas southern and eastern villages are less mountainous but have
more forest cover. These natural geographical distinctions are important because wolverines
live in mountainous habitat and lynx mainly stay in the forest. GIS data can be used to obtain
information on the square kilometers of mountainous and forested area in each village.
3.1.6 Institutional Arrangements
The prominent question concerning institutional arrangements is how the group members
decide to use or distribute the benefits of the common pool resource, which in the Swedish
case is the performance payment that can either be invested for community expenses or
distributed to individual reindeer herders. The existing collective action literature has paid
little attention to this question. However, since the benefit distribution rule is hypothesized
to impact the outcomes of community-based natural resource management, it is important
to understand the underlying mechanisms which lead to a particular distribution rule. The
following section investigates this question at more depth.
3.2 Determinants of the Payment Distribution Decision
In previous literature, benefit distribution rules have generally been assumed to be exoge-
nously predetermined (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001). In many cases, this assumption may not
reflect the prevailing circumstances particularly well. In practice, groups often autonomously
design their benefit distribution rules. We hypothesize that the rule decided upon by the group
is an outcome of its internal characteristics and dynamics. By disregarding questions of how
a benefit distribution rule is established, researchers run the risk of missing important factors
that may impact the outcome of common pool resource problems.
The payment distribution decision is explicitly for the performance payments and not for
other income sources, if any3. Typical common investments are for maintenance of facilities,
such as fences or cottages, and fees for helicopters to round up reindeer. If the payment is
distributed to individuals, it is generally allocated according to herd size. However, there are
two villages in which the money is paid per identified killed reindeer. Since the number of
3 Other joint income sources can stem from the sale of seasonal fishing licenses, sale of reindeer calves that
were not marked by the owners, or compensations from hydropower plants or windmill entrepreneurs for
reductions in grazing land. These income sources are usually a lot smaller than the carnivore performance
payments.
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reindeer a herder loses, in the long run, is proportional to herd size, making payments based
on killed reindeer can be interpreted as equivalent to issuing payments according to herd size.
We hypothesize that in a first step, each herder in a village computes the division of the
money that would maximize his personal utility. In a second step, the herders then collectively
negotiate the final division of the money. To determine an individual’s optimal payment
distribution we develop a simple Cobb–Douglas utility maximization model. In the model,
the share of the total performance payment distributed directly to the individuals is termed
α, and the share retained for community expenses is 1 − α. A reindeer herder maximizes his
utility, which is a function of his private income, R, and the community investment, C , both
of which will depend on α:
U (α) = R(α)γ C(α)1−γ (1)
where the elasticities γ and 1 − γ of the Cobb–Douglas function indicate an individual’s
preferences for private income versus community investments.
The herder’s private income
R(α) = p[F(xi ) − k(W )] + πi + α xiXT V (W ) (2)
consists of the sum of revenue derived from the sale of reindeer meat, p[F(xi ) − k(W )],
his off-farm income, πi , and his individual direct share of the performance payment money,
α
xi
XT V (W ), where W is the number of carnivores, and
xi
XT is the individual’s share of the
village’s total number of reindeer, XT . To maintain a constant reindeer stock, xi , the herder
is assumed to only sell the net growth of his herd. This is determined by the growth of his
stock F(xi ), which is a logistic growth function, minus the number of reindeer that are killed
by carnivores, k(W ), (with ∂k/∂W > 0). The exogenous price of reindeer meat, net of
management and slaughtering costs, is given by p.
The total performance payment issued to the village, V (W ), is a function of the carnivore
stock, with ∂V /∂W > 0. The amount of money directly given to the herder can then be
computed as α xiXT V (W ).
The community investments are simply:
C(α) = (1 − α)V (W ) (3)
With Eqs. (2) and (3) given, the herder maximizes his utility function specified in (1), or
equivalently:
max
a
lnU (α) = γ ln(R(α)) + (1 − γ )ln(C(α)) (4)
The first order condition derived from (4) is:
γ
R(α)
R′(α) = (γ − 1)
C(α)
C ′(α) (5)
where the prime indicates the derivative. Given (2) and (3), Eq. (5) can be rewritten as:
γ
xi
XT V (W )
p[F(xi ) − k(W )] + πi + α xiXT V (W )
= (γ − 1)(−V (W ))
(1 − α)V (W ) (6)
Solving for α yields the herder’s individual optimality condition:
α∗ = γ − (1 − γ )[p(F(xi ) − k(W )) + πi ]xi
XT V (W )
(7)
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Once all herders have identified their personally optimal alpha, the village’s choice of payment
distribution is assumed to be based on voting. A special characteristic of the Sami villages
is that they have a weighted voting system. The number of votes is allocated according to an
individual’s reindeer herd size, with one vote corresponding to one hundred reindeer. This is
a similar system to shareholder meetings. Applying the median voter theorem (Cornes and
Sandler 1996) to this special case implies that the village-level outcome will correspond to the
‘median vote’ rather than the median voter4. Equation (7) can be used to derive hypotheses
on the determinants of the payment distribution rule that can then be empirically tested.
Hypothesis 1 Villages with comparatively higher carnivore populations are expected to allo-
cate more of their performance payments directly to the individual herders. This hypothesis
builds on the derivative of (7) w. r. t. W:
∂αi/∂W = (1 − γi )XT x−1i
[
V (W )−2[p(F(xi ) − k(W )) + πi ] + pV (W )−1∂k/∂W
]
> 0,
which is always positive under the sufficient condition that growth of the reindeer stock is
larger than predation F(xi ) > k(W ).
It suggests that an increase in a village’s carnivore population is reflected in an increase in
the performance payment and an increase in predation by carnivores. This will increase the
optimal alpha for each villager and cause a shift in the preference distribution of all herders
in a village towards a larger alpha. In consequence, the median vote holder will also opt for
a larger alpha.
If the condition F(xi ) > k(W ) were not satisfied, the carnivores would gradually eliminate
the reindeer population. By law, the carnivore population in Sweden may not rise to a level
at which reindeer herding is no longer possible (Swedish Government Bill 2000).
Hypothesis 2 Villages in which the median vote holders have a higher preference for private
income over community investments will, on average, allocate more of the performance
payment directly to the herders. This can be seen from
∂αi/∂γi = 1 + [p(F(xi ) − k(W )) + πi ]XT x−1i V (W )−1 > 0 for F(xi ) > k(W ).
We use the number of herders in a village as a proxy for the preference for private income.
The larger a group is, the more difficult it may be to decide collectively on the use and
distribution of common investments, thus increasing the preference for private income.
Hypothesis 3 Villages with many reindeer and a high concentration of reindeer ownership
will, on average, allocate a larger share of the payment directly to the herders. The derivative
of alpha with respect to an individual’s herd size
∂αi/∂xi = XT V (W )−1(1 − γi )
[
x−2i (p(F(xi ) − k(W )) + πi ) − px−1i ∂ F/∂xi
]
is always positive under two sufficient conditions: growth being larger than predation,
F(xi ) > k(W ), and marginal growth being negative, ∂ F/∂xi < 0. The latter is likely to
apply to the Swedish case because each village has a state-defined quota for total herd size,
which represents each village’s reindeer-carrying capacity. The villages’ total herd sizes are
close to the quota. The existence of the quota also explains why herd size is not a function
of carnivores.
4 In practice, the villages only take a formal vote if there is a dispute and otherwise agree by consensus during
their annual meetings, or “stormöte”.
123
622 A. Zabel et al.
We hypothesize that villages in which some herders have very large numbers of reindeer
will, on average, opt for a larger alpha. The concentration of reindeer ownership at the village-
level can be expressed through a Gini coefficient. We hypothesize that an increase in the Gini
coefficient is associated with an increase in alpha.
Hypothesis 4 More of the performance payment will be allocated directly to herders if there
is inequality of losses to carnivore attacks on a village’s winter pastures. In many villages,
the reindeer are split into smaller groups during winter. For example, some may be closer
to a forest and more prone to carnivore attacks than on a pasture close to a settlement.
The variable δv takes the value 1 if there are systematic inequalities in carnivore attacks on
different winter pastures and zero otherwise5. This hypothesis is not directly based on Eq.
(7). However, it implies that more of the payment will be distributed directly to herders if
some suffer proportionally higher losses than others in the village.
Equation (7) contains two further parameters that can impact an individual’s optimal
alpha. First, a marginal increase in off-farm income decreases an individual’s optimal
alpha ∂αi/∂πi = −XT (1 − γi )/xi V (W ) < 0 . Unfortunately, it is not possible, from this
individual-level variable, to infer possible changes in the overall village-level preference
distribution for alpha. It is thus not possible to make a statement on whether and in which
direction the median vote for alpha would shift.
Second, an increase in reindeer meat price would increase an individual’s optimal
alpha, i.e. he would prefer to personally obtain a larger share of the performance payment
∂αi/∂p = −XT (1 − γi )(F(xi ) − k(W ))/xi V (W ) < 0 if F(xi ) > k(W ) . However, there
is no substantial variation in reindeer meat prices across villages.
Since alpha, the share of money allocated to the herders, has corner solutions at 0 and
1, we apply a Tobit regression to test our hypotheses empirically. The Tobit model can be
specified as follows,
A∗v = β0 + β1Wv + β2γv + β3χv + β4δv + uv
Av = max(A∗v, 0) (8)
where Av is the observed value for the share (α) of money given to the herders in village
v. A∗v is the latent variable and uv(0, σ 2) is the normally-distributed error term. χv is a
Gini coefficient expressing the inequality or concentration of herd sizes in a village, and
δv is a dummy variable reflecting inequalities of damage, i.e. carnivore attacks on different
winter pastures in one village. Based on the hypotheses developed above, we expect all four
coefficients β1, β2, β3, β4 to be positive.
Figure 2 below summarizes the framework of our empirical assessment. The determinates
of collective action were discussed in Section 3.1 while Section 3.2 laid a special focus on
investigating the payment distribution rule.
4 Empirical Analysis
The data required for the analysis of the Swedish performance payment scheme for carnivore
conservation were collected in two steps. In each village, one reindeer herder is designated
to be the village’s carnivore representative. This person attends meetings on carnivore issues
and is the contact person and mediator for all carnivore matters vis-a-vis the government.
From August to October 2008, structured interviews were conducted with the carnivore rep-
resentatives of all villages, except one who refused to participate in the study. The interviews
5 Lacking continuous data we use a binary variable which can pick up less variation in the data.
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Determinants of collective action:
• Group size
• Heterogeneity
• Exit options
• Social capital
• Payment distribution rule
Conservation success
Determinants of payment 
distribution:
• Group size
• Damage inequality 
• Heterogeneity
Resource system characteristics
Fig. 2 Framework for empirical assessment of conservation success under a performance payment scheme
were all conducted by one of the authors and in most cases took place in the interviewees’
homes.
The household-level data was obtained through a mail survey. In February 2009, the survey
was sent to a sample of 970 registered reindeer owners between 18 and 65 years of age, and
in April a reminder was sent to all who had not yet responded. The sample population
represents 25.3 % of the total number of reindeer owners in this age cohort. The sample
was stratified according to the villages’ population. The final response rate obtained was
41.3 %. Concerning representativeness of the responses, we find that there is no significant
difference between the mean age of the respondents (45.88 years) and the mean age of the
sample population (46.12 years). The gender distribution of the respondents (59 % men, 41 %
women) is not significantly different from that of the total population of Swedish reindeer
herders (62 % men, 38 % women) (Sametinget 2009). Furthermore, 84.5 % of the sample
population belongs to Sami villages in the county of Norrbotten, 7.6 % to Västerbotten,
and 7.8 % to Jämtland. This regional division was also well-reflected in the responses and
not significantly different from the sample: 86.9 % of the responses came from villages in
Norrbotten, 6.03 % from Västerbotten, and 7.04 % from Jämtland.
According to the theoretical framework outlined in Figure 2 and discussed above, we
conduct econometric analyses to explain the payment distribution rule and variation in con-
servation success at the village level under a performance payment scheme. Table 1 provides
a summary overview of the variables used. The data we collected represents one point in time.
Although the policy has been in place for more than a decade, data availability necessitates
a cross-sectional approach.
The dependent variables for conservation success are measured as the total number of lynx
and wolverine offspring, respectively, per village that were certified between 1996 and 2006.
The key variable indicating the villages’ payment distribution decision is the percentage
of the payment directly distributed to the herders (‘Share_herders’). Figure 3 depicts this
variable’s distribution. The distribution has three spikes, at 0 % (i.e. none of the performance
payments are allocated directly to the individual herders), 50, and 100 % (i.e. all of the
performance payments are allocated directly to the individual herders). As noted above, any
remaining share of the money is used for common investments such as maintenance of fences
or expenses for helicopters to round up reindeer.
Herd size data were obtained from secondary information on all enterprises in a village.
Unfortunately, the data on herd size is not available for seven villages located in the northeast
of Sweden, near the border with Finland 6.
6 This bears the risk of biasing the results. We will therefore conduct the analysis below both with and without
variables related to herd size
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Table 1 Variables used in the analysis of the Swedish performance payment scheme
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Lynx Lynx offspring 1996–2006 per
village
33.39 35.55 0.00 141.50 50
Wolverines Wolverine offspring 1996–2006 per
village
13.92 15.99 0.00 63.23 50
Share_herders Percentage of performance payment
allocated to individuals directly in
each village
0.44 0.39 0.00 1.00 50
Group_size Number of reindeer enterprises in
each village
35.17 43.74 2.00 220.00 50
Gini_herd Gini index measuring heterogeneity
resp. concentration of reindeer
ownership in each village
0.39 0.16 0.02 0.66 43
Exit_option Average for each village of
respondents’ percentage of
working time spent outside
reindeer herding sector
58.08 24.86 0.00 87.50 49
Social_capital Average score for perception of
cohesion in each village (1=high,
5=low perceived cohesion)
2.68 0.77 1.00 4.33 49
Carnivores Sum of lynx and wolverine offspring
per village 1996–2006
47.30 40.20 0.00 158.99 50
Damage_inequality Dummy indicating if carnivore
attacks are systematically more
severe on some of a village’s winter
pastures than on others
0.00 1.00 50
Forest Forested area per village in units of
1000 square kilometers
2.76 2.27 0.14 9.33 50
Mountain Mountainous area per village in units
of 1000 square kilometers
0.68 0.72 0.00 3.06 50
Forest_mountain Sum of forested and mountainous
area per village in units of 1000
square kilometers
3.44 2.51 0.55 10.20 50
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Fig. 3 Empirical distribution of the variable ‘share_herders’ (alpha)
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The availability of exit options is approximated as the average percentage of working time
that respondents spent outside of the reindeer herding sector during the past year. The proxy
for social capital is computed as a village-level average that is based on responses from the
household survey. Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion on the statement that
most members in their village are interested in their common welfare and only a few are solely
interested in their private welfare. To obtain data for the variable on damage inequality, the
carnivore representatives of each village were asked whether all herders suffer proportionally
equal reindeer losses in winter. Village’s forested and mountainous areas are used as proxies
for natural geographic characteristics because the lynx habitat is the forest and wolverines
prefer mountains.
4.1 Test of Model for Payment Distribution Decision
The empirical data allows for a test of the model on the village internal payment distribution
decision developed in Section 3.2. Table 2 presents the results for the instrumental variable
Tobit models. An instrumental variable approach is necessary because we hypothesize that the
number of carnivore offspring, i.e. conservation success, is also an outcome of the payment
distribution rule. The instrument chosen is the sum of forested and mountainous area in each
village. In brackets behind the names of the independent variables are the model parameters
that are being proxied and their predicted sign.
Table 2 Results of village-level IV-Tobit analysis for ‘Share_herders’, i.e. the percentage of performance
payments directly distributed to the reindeer herders. The dependent variable for the 1st stage is ‘Carnivores’
Variables 2a 2b
1st stage IV tobit 1st stage IV tobit
Carnivores (W,+) 0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Group_size (γ ,+) −.576*** 0.012** −.308*** 0.010***
(0.211) (0.005) (0.089) (0.003)
Gini_herd (χ ,+) 4.116 −0.145
(31.254) (0.652)
Damage_inequality (δ,+) 16.930* 0.346 13.477 0.427**
(9.315) (0.211) (8.242) (0.211)
Forest_mountain (+) 9.450*** 9.228***
(1.827) (1.547)
constant 17.576 −0.383 17.080* −0.563*
(12.196) (0.292) (8.997) (0.293)
N 43 50
Log likelihood −236.116 −274.181
Pseudo-R2 0.36 0.36
left-censored 16 18
uncensored 22 24
right-censored 5 8
Standard errors in parenthesis
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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The model presented in column 2a tests all four hypotheses developed in Section 3.2.
Only the coefficient for group size is significant and has the expected sign. Apart from the
coefficient for the Gini index, which proxies the concentration of reindeer ownership, the
other variables’ coefficients have the expected sign but are not significant. Unfortunately,
for several villages there is no data available on the variable ‘Gini_herd’. Column 2b thus
presents the same model but without this variable. There, the coefficients remain largely
unchanged, with only the significances for group size and damage inequality increasing.
Referring to the hypotheses set up in Section 3.2, we thus cannot reject hypotheses 2
and 4 but do reject hypotheses 1 and 3. The results suggest that group size, which in terms
of our model proxies the preference for private income, is an important factor determining
the payment distribution rule. Costs of negotiating on community expenditures are likely to
increase with group size. High negotiation costs in turn render private income preferable over
community investments. Furthermore, it is notable that the absolute number of carnivores
seems to be of lesser importance, while inequalities of damage on winter pastures within a
village has an impact on the payment distribution rule.
4.2 Variation in Conservation Across Villages
Conservation outcomes, measured in numbers of offspring, are hypothesized to be a function
of collective action within a village, a village’s payment distribution rule, and its natural
geographic features. The models for lynx and wolverine conservation are presented in Tables
3 and 4. The first column in both tables is a theory-driven model where the payment dis-
tribution rule is hypothesized to depend endogenously on the conservation outcome. This
endogeneity assumption is derived from the model developed in Section 3.2. A two-stage
least squares (2SLS) approach is applied to account for endogeneity. In the tables below,
column (a) presents the results of the first stage and column (b) the results of the instru-
mental variables regressions. The instrumental variable for the share of money distributed
directly to herders is ‘Damage_inequality’, i.e. systematic differences in severity of carni-
vore attacks on different winter pastures. However, the results of Wu-Hausman-tests for the
2SLS regressions in Table 3 (F(1,33) = 0.9244) and Table 4 (F(1,33) = 0.5825) both indicate
that the payment distribution variable (‘Share_herders’) is not endogenous. This finding is in
accordance with the finding that the variable ‘Carnivores’ was not significant in Table 2 of
Section 4.1.
Column (c) in both tables thus presents an OLS regression model in which the payment
distribution rule is treated as an exogenous variable. Since we are lacking data on the Gini
index for seven villages, we also ran these OLS regression models without this variable.
Eliminating the Gini index as an explanatory variable did not produce major changes in
parameter results for the other variables. Column (d) in both tables presents OLS regres-
sion results for a model including only the natural-geographical variable ‘or ‘Mountain’,
respectively.
In a first step we conduct F-tests to assess whether the socio-economic variables together
significantly aid in explaining more of the variance in conservation success than simply
the natural-geographic variables. The tests reveal that in the lynx case (F(5,34) = 2.57),
the addition of the socio-economic variables significantly improves the model’s explanatory
power, whereas in the wolverine case (F(5,34) = 0.78) it does not. These results are reinforced
by the results of Ramsey RESET tests which test for omitted variables (Cameron and Trivedi
2009). For the wolverine model in column (d) of Table 4 the test indicates that there are no
omitted variables (F(3,45) = 2.31). The corresponding test for the regression of ‘Lynx’ on
‘Forest’ in Table 3 (F(3,45) = 6.98) states that there are omitted variables.
123
Performance Payments for Groups 627
Table 3 Results for the analysis of lynx conservation
VARIABLES (3a) 2SLS (first stage) (3b) 2SLS (3c) OLS (3d) OLS
Share_herders Lynx Lynx Lynx
Share_herders (+/−) 69.35* 31.80**
(41.691) (13.320)
Group_size (−) 0.006** −0.835** −0.570**
(.003) (.373) (0.245)
Gini_herd (−) 0.024 −37.56 −36.45
(.411) (34.107) (33.701)
Exit_option (−) 0.0001 −0.215 −0.232
(.002) (.195) (0.192)
Social_capital (−) 0.073 −4.247 −1.325
(.069) (6.577) (5.750)
Forest (+) 0.015 6.858*** 7.377*** 8.526***
(.025) (2.125) (2.030) (1.898)
Damage_inequality (+) 0.244*
(.123)
Constant −0.166 45.45* 45.84** 9.823
(.274) (21.516) (21.269) (6.760)
Observations 41 41 41 50
R-squared 0.301 0.369 0.489 0.296
Adj. R-squared 0.178 0.258 0.398 0.281
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
4.3 Results
The findings of the F-tests and omitted variable tests point to important policy differences
between lynx and wolverine management. For lynx, legal hunting permissions have been
granted quite generously because the government has decreed that the total lynx population
may decrease in the reindeer herding area. This supports the implication that our regression
models show collective action factors that impact the decision on legal lynx population
management within the villages.
The important policy difference in the wolverine case is that permissions for protective
hunting have been granted only on a highly restrictive basis. Although it may seem likely that
the factors impacting the villages’ lynx population-management decisions also apply in the
wolverine case, they do not. The variable ‘Group_size’ is significant and has the hypothesized
negative sign. The Gini index is also significant but does not have the expected sign. However,
an F-test for a comparison of model (4c) with and without these two variables (F(2,34)=1.69)
reveals that their addition does not significantly improve the explanatory power of the model.
The main factor impacting variation in wolverine conservation across villages is abundance
of mountainous area. This single variable can explain nearly three-fourths of the variation.
Since we cannot detect a significant impact of socio-economic variables, the data allows for
the conclusion that the herders, by and large, let the wolverine population develop naturally,
i.e. they refrain from illegal poaching.
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Table 4 Results for the analysis of wolverine conservation
VARIABLES (4a) 2SLS (first stage) (4b) 2SLS (4c) OLS (4d) OLS
Share_herders Wolverines Wolverines Wolverines
Share_herders (+/−) −10.11 −0.253
(13.288) (3.984)
Group_size (−) 0.005* −0.109 −0.169**
(0.003) (0.105) (0.072)
Gini_herd (−) 0.071 25.47** 24.96**
(0.388) (9.362) (9.442)
Exit_option (−) −0.0003 −0.008 0.001
(0.002) (0.057) (0.057)
Social_capital (−) 0.074 0.190 −0.599
(0.069) (1.967) (1.703)
Mountain (+) 0.061 20.368*** 19.5*** 19.221***
(0.081) (2.252) (1.977) (1.567)
Damage_inequality (+) 0.225*
(0.124)
Constant −0.137 −3.408 −3.549 0.844
(0.268) (6.129) (6.193) (1.548)
Observations 41 41 41 50
R-squared 0.305 0.744 0.783 0.758
Adj. R-squared 0.182 0.699 0.745 0.753
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The regression results for lynx conservation reveal that the variables ‘Share_herders’
‘Group_size’, and ‘Forest’ have a significant impact. The coefficient for ‘Share_herders’
is positive, suggesting that issuing a larger fraction of the performance payment directly to
herders, on average, is advantageous for lynx conservation. As hypothesized, group size has a
negative impact on conservation outcomes. The larger the group, the less frequent are personal
interrelationships between all members. Anonymity increases while the incentives to consider
reputation effects may decrease. Additionally, as group size increases, communication and
bargaining costs increase. These characteristics may decrease the benefits of conservation
to such a degree that, for large groups, applying for permission to hunt a lynx becomes
the preferable outcome. In other words, in large groups the costs of collectively agreeing
to engage in conservation may be higher than the benefits derived from the performance
payments, i.e. the performance payments subtractive of the cost of reindeer losses.
The abundance of tree-covered areas measured by the variable ‘Forest’ clearly has a
positive and strongly significant impact on lynx conservation outcomes. The model in column
(d) of Table 3 reveals that this variable alone captures nearly 30 % of the variation in the
number of lynx offspring.
Although not significant, the collective action variables ‘Gini_herd’, which proxies hetero-
geneity, ‘Exit_option’, and ‘Social_capital’ all have the expected negative sign. According
to the theory presented above, the negative sign for ‘Gini_herd’ may point to rivalry and
envy, which increase with inequality of reindeer ownership and hamper collective action in
the communities. Also in line with the theory, the negative sign for the social capital index
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suggests that, on average, conservation success is lower in villages where members feel there
is little community cohesion. The negative coefficient for ‘Exit_option’ indicates that when
herders, on average, spend less time in the reindeer business, conservation success is lower.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has empirically assessed (1) whether differences in conservation outcomes across
villages are a function of collective action and (2) what determines villages’ internal benefit
distribution rules for the first large-scale performance payment scheme for carnivore conser-
vation. Concerning the first question, we hypothesized that variation in conservation success
across villages is a function of the natural-geographic environment, collective action, and
particularly the villages’ decisions on how to allocate internally the monetary benefits of
conservation, i.e. the performance payments.
The econometric analysis on cross-village differences in wolverine conservation outcomes
revealed that the abundance of mountainous area, which is wolverines’ preferred habitat, is
the most important single factor impacting the number of wolverine offspring. The collective
action variables did not significantly add to the explanation of variation in conservation
outcomes.
Contrary to the wolverine case, socio-economic variables did significantly add to the
explanation of variation in lynx conservation outcomes among villages. We ascribe this
difference to the fact that applications for protective hunting of lynx were granted quite
generously. Essentially, the outcome of the decision on whether to apply for protective hunting
or to let the carnivore population develop and subsequently reap the performance payments
depends on a village’s potential for collective action. Unfortunately, we lack village-level
data on protective hunting which limits our ability to substantiate this reasoning. Among
the indicators for collective action, group size was most significant and suggested that there
is a negative relationship between group size and conservation success. Concerning the
payment distribution rule, the regression results pointed to a positive relationship between the
allocation of performance payments directly to individuals and increased lynx conservation.
Concerning the second question of how villages’ internal benefit distribution rules come
about, this paper presented a model based on which we could derive hypotheses for empirical
testing. The main empirical findings are that, on average, a larger group size and prevailing
differences in the likelihood of experiencing carnivore attacks on different winter pastures
in a village will induce the village members to allocate a larger share of the performance
payments directly to individual members. Although the rules governing the distribution of
benefits of common pool resources are often stated to be an important determinant for the
success of collective resource management (Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2001), little work has
previously been done on explaining how these rules emerge.
Looking at the results of both empirical parts of the paper, it is notable that group size
impacts variation in lynx conservation outcomes across villages in two ways. On the one
hand, the direct effect is negative, as predicted by collective action theory and shown in Table
3. On the other hand, by analyzing the payment distribution rule, we found that villages with
more members allocate more of the performance payments directly to the herders, which has
a positive effect on conservation outcomes. This result revises, at least in part, the general
collective action hypothesis that an increase in group size necessarily has only negative effects
on collective action.
Together with the significance of the payment distribution variable, this finding highlights
the importance of investigating mechanisms leading to a specific benefit distribution rule in
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common pool resource problems. The model we present to analyze the Swedish case could
easily be adapted to other applications.
The empirical results of the study may be of particular interest to developers of REDD
(Reduced Emissions for Deforestation and Degradation) projects since they face very similar
challenges in jointly evaluating and rewarding groups of individuals. Although the inferences
that can be made from our study may be restricted due to the lack of a counterfactual, we sug-
gest that policymakers interested in group rewards pay attention to group internal distribution
rules. With respect to REDD programs in developing countries, individual rewards may help
circumvent elite capture, a problem that is of lesser concern in Sweden. Group size was found
to be a particularly important factor in Sweden but other characteristics such as economic
homogeneity, social capital, and exit options may play a greater role in other countries.
The Swedish case is a rare example of a performance payment scheme for biodiversity
conservation. To enhance the understanding of this type of incentive mechanism, further
research is necessary. In particular, the comparison to a region in which the policy is not
implemented but that is very similar in all other characteristics would be ideal. Unfortunately,
such a region is nonexistent for the Swedish case discussed in this paper. An interesting
question for further research would also be to test the transferability of the performance
payment approach to a developing country setting, particularly in the tropics, where wildlife-
livestock conflicts are often especially severe. If attacks on livestock threaten the resilience of
poor rural farmers, the latter have an incentive to hunt the damage-causing carnivores. In such
cases, performance payments may be an appealing alternative to current, more conventional
conservation policies.
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